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The terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 highlighted the vulnerabilities of 
airports and aircraft.  Further attacks 
in 2002, 2007 and 2009, have led 
to major government reforms in 
passenger processing and airport 
access.  The security of Australian 
airports has also followed this trend, 
with an increased police presence. 
However, limited consideration has 
been given to the costs of these 
measures, compared to benefit.  This 
Working Paper identifies the factors 
to be considered in such cost-benefit 
analyses and the authors outline 
their preliminary findings.  The scope 
for further research is highlighted, 
particularly in relation to risk analysis 
and cost.
Dr Ruth Delaforce
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CEPS Adjunct Fellow
Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Australian Federal Police
Counter-Terrorism Operations at 
Australian Airports
Professor Mark G. Stewart and Professor John Mueller
1. INTRODUCTION
Much research on aviation security focuses on airplanes due no doubt to the events 
of September 11 2001 and to the more recent attempts to bomb U.S. bound flights 
in 2002, 2006 and 2009. However, Elias (2010) notes that an airport has ‘unique 
vulnerabilities because it is unsecured’. There is little information about whether airport 
security satisfies a cost-benefit assessment, or how airport policing can be made more 
effective. The Australian Office of Best Practice Regulation, U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, and other regulatory agencies strongly recommend risk and cost-benefit 
assessments of major programmes. A risk and cost-benefit assessment quantifies 
risk reduction of security measures, losses from a successful attack, threat likelihood, 
probability that attack is successful, and cost of security measures. This allows costs 
and benefits of security measures to be compared and optimal security measures to 
be selected. This Working Paper seeks to assess the risks and cost-effectiveness of 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) airport counter-terrorism (CT) policing designed to 
protect airport terminals and aircraft from terrorist attack. 
Note that the results presented herein are preliminary, and based on our ‘best 
estimates’ using publicly sourced material. Thus all data should be seen as illustrative 
rather than definitive, and are used as a ‘proof-of-concept’ of how a risk and cost-
benefit analysis can be applied to the challenging area of policing resource allocation. 
2. AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE AND AVIATION SECURITY
The AFP has primary responsibility for policing and security at Australia’s 10 major 
airports, namely Cairns, Brisbane, Gold Coast, Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Hobart, 
Adelaide, Perth, and Darwin. The 2009 Beale Review describes the full complement of 
operational uniformed and non-uniformed Unified Policing Model staffing as at 29 May 
2009 (see Table 1). AFP airport CT policing is designed to protect airport terminals and 
aircraft from terrorist attack.  The number of AFP or state police at airports with the 
specific task of counter-terrorism (CT) comprises the Counter-Terrorism First Response 
(CTFR) and 50% of the Joint Airport Intelligence Groups (JAIG) - this totals 460 staff or 
59% of police staffing at airports. 
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Recommendations from both the Aviation White Paper (2010) 
and the Beale Review (2009) have led the AFP to transition from 
a Unified Policing Model (UPM) to the ‘All-In’ Model of Aviation 
policing and security. The ‘All-In’ model allows the airport 
uniform police and CFTR to transition into a homogenised, 
fully-sworn AFP police officer workforce. The Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs hearing on 24 
May 2012 noted that, following full implementation of the ‘All-
In’ model, the final number of AFP officers would be 657, at an 
estimated direct (salaries) cost of approximately $80 million per 
year . This does not include the national canine program. It is 
also noted that, in December 2011, the AFP withdrew from Alice 
Springs Airport. 
The cost estimate of $80 million per year also does not 
include the cost of unsworn staff, and equipment, facilities, 
depreciation and other operating costs. The AFP’s 2012 budget 
is $1.289 billion, its personnel complement being 4,157 AFP and 
protective service officers, and 2,386 unsworn staff. If aviation 
security deploys 657 AFP officers, then this constitutes 15.8% 
of the total number of AFP officers - a pro-rata analysis suggests 
that aviation security has a budget of approximately $200 million 
per year. This is confirmed by forward estimates for the 2010-
11 Federal Budget that includes $759.4 million over 4 years for 
continuation of the Unified Policing Model for 11 airports (AG 
2010, Yates 2010) - or $189.85 million per year. We will round 
this down to $185 million as a result of the AFP withdrawal from 
Alice Springs Airport in 2011. 
Following full implementation of the ‘All-In’ model, the final 
number of AFP officers is 657, a reduction from the 2009 estimate 
of 780 (see Table 1). It is not clear whether this reduction is 
equally shared between community and counter-terrorism 
policing. We will assume that the proportion of AFP airport 
policing officers with the specific task of counter-terrorism is 
50%. The cost of airport CT policing at 10 airports in Australia is 
50% of $185 million, or approximately $90 million per year. 
Description Staffing
Airport Police 
Commanders
Responsible for the unified command and control of policing at the eleven major 
airports.
11
Airport Uniform 
Police
Perform general policing duties at airports. Their visible presence also contributes 
to crime prevention and deterrence efforts. The UPM draws heavily from state and 
territory police jurisdictions.
225
Counter-Terrorism 
and First Response
Focuses on the deterrence, prevention and response to acts of terrorism and/or 
unlawful interference to aircraft (hijacking). Sixty-three CTFR members have also 
been trained to conduct preliminary bomb assessments.
445
Joint Airport 
Investigation 
Teams
Comprising AFP, State/Territory police and Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service (ACBPS) personnel, target serious and organised crime across 
the aviation network.
51
Joint Airport 
Intelligence Groups
Coexist with the JAITs and are jointly staffed by AFP, State/Territory police and 
ACBPS analysts to provide dedicated intelligence support to the UPM.
31
Police Aviation 
Liaison Officers
Primary communication conduits between the UPM and the wider aviation indus-
try. These members also provide support to the special processing of dignitaries 
through airports. 
17
TOTAL 780
Table 1. Police Staffing Levels at 11 Airports in Australia (adapted from Beale 2009).
Note: The Unified Policing Model also includes a national canine program delivering an explosive and firearm detection capability to all designated 
airports. Regional Rapid Deployment Teams (RRDT), based at Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney, deliver counterterrorism awareness training 
and other security activities
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3.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The standard definition of risk is:
 (Risk) = (Threat) X (Vulnerability) X (Consequences)                  
where
• Threat - annual probability there will be a terrorist attempt
• Vulnerability - probability of loss (that the explosive will 
be successfully detonated or the gun will fire leading to 
damage and loss of life) given the attempt
• Consequences - loss or consequence (economic costs, 
number of people harmed) if the attack is successful in 
causing damage.
This is consistent with the conceptual framework adopted by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (NRC 2010) and 
risk analyses for many applications (e.g., Stewart and Melchers 
1997).  Security measures should result in risk reduction that 
may arise from a combination of reduced likelihood of threat, 
vulnerability or consequences. For any security measure the risk 
reduction can vary from 0% to 100% (or even a negative number 
for an ill-suited security measure).  A security measure is cost-
effective when the benefit outweighs the costs of providing the 
security measure - i.e.,  the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds one.
The reduction in risk is the degree to which the security measure 
foils, deters, disrupts, or protects against a terrorist attack. The 
benefit of a security measure is the sum of the losses averted 
due to the security measure and, any expected co-benefit 
from the security measure not directly related to mitigating 
vulnerability or threat (such as reduction in crime, improved 
passenger experience, etc). This benefit is then compared to the 
cost of the security measure which should include opportunity 
costs. A security measure is cost-effective if the benefit exceeds 
the cost. 
 
In essence, this process requires the evaluation of six readily-
understandable considerations:
1. Threat - likelihood of a terrorist attack
2. Vulnerability - likelihood that a threat results in a ‘successful’ 
attack
3. Consequences - consequences of a successful terrorist attack
4. Risk Reduction - degree to which the proposed security measure 
is likely to reduce either the consequences, vulnerability or the 
likelihood of a terrorist attack
5. Co-Benefits - benefits of security measure not related to risk 
reduction
6. Cost - cost of the proposed security measure
The Australian Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR), U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) and other regulatory agencies 
strongly recommend risk-neutral attitudes in their decision-making 
as described by the above equations (e.g., OBPR 2010, OMB 1992, 
Faber and Stewart 2003, Sunstein 2002, Stewart et al. 2011). This 
entails using mean or average estimates for risk and cost-benefit 
calculations, and not worst-case or pessimistic estimates. 
There is clearly uncertainty in any prediction of threat probability, 
particularly in a dynamic threat environment where the threat 
may arise from an intelligent adversary who will adapt to changing 
circumstances to maximise likelihood of success. It is true, of course, 
that some terrorist attacks are carefully planned. However, many, 
quite possibly most, terrorist target selection effectively becomes 
something like a random process (Mueller and Stewart 2011a,b, 
2012). In most cases, target selection for perpetrators may not be 
random, but this would essentially be the case for people trying 
to anticipate and counter their next move. Nonetheless, a more 
workable solution is a ‘break-even’ analysis where the outcome 
of the analysis is the minimum threat probability or risk reduction 
needed for a security measure to be cost-effective.
3.1 Threats
We consider six threats to airports and aircraft:
• Airports:
1. large Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices 
(VBIEDs) in non-screened (public) place
2. small Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in non-
screened (public) place
3. shooting in screened and non-screened areas
• Aircraft:
4. IED in checked luggage
5. suicide bomber boards aircraft
6. hijackers boards aircraft (replication of 9/11 type 
attack)
These threats have been called ‘major vulnerabilities’ or 
‘major’ threats that can kill a large number of people (Stevens 
et al. 2004, Elias 2010). Other threats to airport facilities or 
aircraft seem unlikely (Stevens et al. 2004). 
                     
Benefit Benefit-to-Cost Ratio =                                   
         Cost
= (
Risk) X (Reduction in Risk Generated by the Security Measure) + (Co-Benefits)                                                                                                                                                                             
                                             (Cost of Security Measure)
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In the fourteen year period 1998-2011, the Global Terrorism 
Database1  recorded 20 attacks on airports, large and small, 
in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Europe. Most of these 
hurt no one and did no significant damage.  In total, these 
incidents resulted in the deaths of 64 people, 37 of them 
in a single suicide explosion in the baggage claim section at 
Moscow’s Domodedovo airport in 2011. Notable among the 
other attacks were an attempted, but failed, bombing of the 
Glasgow international airport in 2007 and the shooting of two 
people at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International 
Airport in 2002 (Campbell 2002, Townsend et al 2007).
Over the same period there were 31 attacks on aircraft. In 
total, attacks on aviation account for only 0.5% of all terrorist 
attacks, and attacks on airports comprise less than half of 
these. This experience led the 2007 U.S. National Strategy 
for Aviation Security to observe that ‘reported threats to 
aviation infrastructure (including) airports and air navigation 
facilities … are relatively few’ (p 11). A study of the 53 cases 
that have come to light since 9/11 in which Islamist terrorists 
planned, or in many cases vaguely imagined, doing damage 
in the United States finds only one in which an airport facility 
was on the target list (Mueller 2013). It should also be noted 
that, since 9/11, only one attack consisting of two explosions 
has occurred in the United States (Boston 2013) and - except 
for the four bombs on the Underground in London in 2005 - 
none in the United Kingdom (Mueller and Stewart 2011b). 
This suggests that it may be worthwhile to consider whether 
airports are actually very attractive terrorist targets. If the 
goal of the terrorist is to kill people and inflict physical 
damage, there are far better places to detonate a bomb or 
undertake an armed attack.
We assume that attacks on airports constitute 40% of all 
threats, and 60% for attacks on aircraft. Since there are 
three threat scenarios for airports then the relative threat 
likelihood for threats 1, 2 and 3 is 13.3% (40% divided by 
three), and the relative threat likelihood for threats to aircraft 
is 20% for threats 4, 5 and 6 (60% divided by three). In other 
words, if there is a threat against airports or aircraft, then, 
for example, there will be a 20% likelihood that the threat is a 
suicide bomber attempting to board an aircraft.
3.2 Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the likelihood that a threat results in a ‘successful’ 
attack - i.e., detonation of IED, hijacking or shooting, and that 
the desired damaging effect is achieved. 
1  The Global Terrorism Database is developed by the U.S. National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). It contains 
country-by-country information for more than 80,000 terrorist incidents that 
have taken place throughout the world between 1970 and 2011. See http://www.
start.umd.edu/gtd/    
1. and 2.  
3. 
4. 
5.
 
In principle, an IED is relatively simple to design 
and manufacture if done by well trained personnel, 
resulting in reliabilities in excess of 90% (Grant and 
Stewart 2012). However, the probability of an IED 
creating a damaging effect (casualties) reduces to 19% 
for terrorists in Western countries where there is less 
opportunity for IED operational skills to be acquired 
(Grant and Stewart 2012). This was clearly evident 
from the second attack on the London Underground 
on 21 July 2005 where four IEDs failed to initiate, 
and Glasgow international airport in 2007 and Times 
Square in 2010 where VBIEDs failed to initiate. The 
probability of successful attacks using IEDs increases 
to 65% for terrorists or insurgents in the Middle East 
(Grant and Stewart 2012). 
We assume that, for a small IED where there is less 
device complexity and placement issues, vulnerability 
is 30% (threat 2). This reduces to 15% for complex and 
large IEDs (threat 1) where placement and timing is 
more crucial to achieve maximum damaging effects 
and where both pose substantial difficulties for 
terrorists. Since, as noted, terrorists seem to have 
great difficulty detonating even simple bombs, these 
estimates, are likely quite generous overestimates of 
the capacities of actual terrorists.
A shooting attack is much easier to accomplish 
because guns and ammunition are generally easier 
to acquire and detonate than bombs. Hence, a well 
trained and coordinated shooting has a high chance 
of doing some damage (e.g. Mumbai 2008) leading to 
a vulnerability of 90%.
An IED in checked luggage poses similar challenges as 
threats 1 and 2. The fabrication of a small, compact 
IED suitable for concealed placement in luggage is 
a challenging task, as is its remote detonation. We 
assume the probability of IED success is 30%, which 
is consistent with small IEDs associated with threat 2.
There is a very high likelihood that a suicide bomber 
will be foiled once on the aircraft – as happened 
with both the ‘shoe’ and the ‘underwear’ bombers. 
Moreover, an air explosion might well fail to cause 
the airliner to crash (Stewart and Mueller 2011b). 
Nonetheless, we assume that (Stewart and Mueller 
2011):
• Passengers and trained flight crew have a low 
50/50 chance of foiling a terrorist attempting to 
assemble or detonate an IED.
• Imperfect bomb-making training results in high 
75% chance of IED detonating successfully.
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3.3 Consequences
Since there have been few successful attacks on airports, it 
may be instructive to first consider losses imposed by attacks 
on aircraft. A 2005 RAND study hypothesised that the downing 
of an airliner by a shoulder fired missile would lead to a total 
economic loss of more than $15 billion (Chow et al 2005). The 
9/11 attack on the Pentagon caused up to $10 billion in losses 
including physical damage, loss of life and indirect losses such 
as social and business disruptions (Mueller and Stewart 2011a, 
2011b). 
The September 11, 2001, attack directly resulted in the deaths 
of nearly 3,000 people with an associated loss of approximately 
$20 billion. In addition, 9/11 caused approximately $30 billion 
in physical damage, and the impact on the U.S. economy of the 
9/11 attacks range from $50-150 billion in 2010-11 dollars (e.g. 
Mueller and Stewart 2011b). An upper bound estimate of the 
losses of 9/11 might approach $200 billion. Global airline losses 
from 9/11 total at least $100 billion (Gordon et al. 2007, IATA 
2011). These losses were mainly due to a 1-5% drop in airline 
passengers in 2001 and 2002. The next attack is unlikely to cause 
the same (dramatic) response, and it should be noted that losses 
from 9/11 were also magnified due to a later recession. 
IATA revenue projections to 2020 show approximately 5% 
annual increases in passengers and revenues, with world-wide 
revenues of $598 billion in 2011 (IATA 2012). An attack at a 
major airport might result in a more wary travelling public, and 
might result in no global growth in revenue/passengers for one 
year (ie. equivalent to a 5% revenue or passenger decrease for 
one year) - this is a loss of at least $30 billion. 
This is an extreme case, however. From time to time, terrorists 
have been able to down airliners - the 1988 Lockerbie tragedy 
notable among them - but the response by the flying public has 
not been nearly so extreme as in the aftermath of 9/11. While 
two Russian airliners were blown up by suicidal Chechen female 
terrorists in 2004, that country’s airline industry seems to have 
continued with little interruption. Airline passenger numbers 
after the attack did decline, which has been attributed mainly 
to the 60 percent increase in fuel prices.  By the following year, 
passenger traffic had increased by 3.9 percent (IATA 2010). 
Although the blowing up of an airliner may have considerable 
negative consequences for the airline and travel industry, an 
isolated attack at an airport is unlikely to be anywhere near as 
damaging. The suicide bomb attack at Moscow’s Domodedovo 
airport also had little impact on Russian airlines; indeed 
Russian airlines increased passenger numbers in 2011 by 12.6% 
compared to 2010, and international passengers increased by 
13.2% over the same period (Borondina 2012). Hence, $30 billion 
in airline losses is very much an upper value of consequences of 
a terrorist attack at an airport.
1.
• Aircraft resilience - a 75% chance of an airliner 
crashing if a bomb is successfully detonated.
Hence, under these generous assumptions, the 
probability than an airliner will be downed by a suicide 
bomber (assuming they enter the aircraft undetected) 
is 0.5 × 0.75 × 0.75 = 28.1% which we will round up 
to 30%.  
The likelihood that a commercial passenger airliner 
will be commandeered by small bands of terrorists, 
kept under control for some time, and then crashed 
into specific targets is small. Stewart and Mueller 
(2013a, 2013b) show that the probability that existing 
security measures will deter or detect terrorists prior 
to boarding is a high 70-90%, and that measures on 
the aircraft to foil, prevent or deter the hijackers 
(air marshals, flight crew, passengers, hardened 
cockpit door) and anti-aircraft measures reduces 
the remaining risk by 80%. In total, with existing 
security measures, the probability that hijackers could 
board an airliner undetected and then successfully 
commandeer the aircraft and crash it into a specific 
target is only about 20%.
According to a threat and vulnerability analysis 
conducted by Rudy Weisz (2012) - working from 
studies conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency’s VAPO program in the United States - a large 
truck bomb containing 1,800 kg of TNT detonated 
11 m from the front wall of Dulles International 
Airport near Washington D.C. would wreak ‘immense 
destruction’. Nearly all windows facing the blast would 
be destroyed, and little of the structure would be left 
standing, thereby causing the entire roof to collapse; 
estimated fatalities being 306, or many with severe 
injuries. By way of comparison, this scenario is similar 
to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that killed 165 
people, the 1998 U.S. Embassy attack in Kenya that 
killed 213 people, and the 2008 truck bombing of the 
Islamabad Marriott Hotel that resulted in 54 deaths. 
These attacks, however, appear to be the exception, 
as the average number of fatalities from a VBIED is 36 
and only 0.5% of bomb attacks result in more than 30 
fatalities (LaTourrette et al. 2006). 
Assuming an on-ground explosion would cause an 
average of 50 fatalities, and based on the value of 
a single life (VSL) being $6.5 million (Robinson et al. 
2010), an economic loss of 50 fatalities totals $325 
million. Morral et al. (2012) conclude that 50 fatalities 
from an airport attack is ‘unrealistically high,’ but 
we adopt this figure to be slightly conservative. 
Working paper
2.  
3. 
4. and 5.  
6.
 
3.4 Risk Reduction
Risk reduction is the probability that airport CT policing will 
deter, prevent, disrupt or protect against the threat. Because 
there are many layers of security at airports and in aircraft, the 
effect of one layer, such as airport CT policing, may be small 
when compared to the risk reduction already supplied by the 
remaining security layers. For example, a 2006 London plot to 
put bombs on several transatlantic airliners was thwarted by 
police and intelligence work long before the plot was set into
motion, as was a 2007 plot to ignite fuel lines serving JFK airport 
(Mueller 2013).
Airport CT policing will have the highest risk reduction for a 
shooting attack - mainly by reducing its consequences - because 
police can respond quickly to minimise casualties. VBIED or 
IED threats are more difficult to prevent or ameliorate than a 
shooting attack. A visible police presence may have a deterrent 
effect, but it is unlikely to prevent or disrupt such an attack; 
good intelligence would boost such risk reduction. 
Moreover, most losses arise from indirect causes, not 
from fatalities or injuries, and therefore the results are 
not very sensitive to assumptions about the average 
numbers of fatalities. Physical damage might average 
$100 million. Flight disruptions and relocation of check-
in counters, and so on, might total several billion dollars 
as a plausible upper bound. The additional costs of 
social and business disruptions, loss of tourism, and the 
like, might total $5 billion to $10 billion. A mean total 
loss of $10 billion is reasonable. 
Weisz (2012) concluded that a smaller 45 kg (100 
pound) luggage bomb detonated near a check-in 
counter would also destroy nearly all the windows at 
Dulles International Airport, but inflict considerably 
less structural damage overall, with approximately 
10% of the fatalities caused by a large truck bomb; this 
would represent about 30 fatalities or severe injuries 
valued at $200 million. The 2011 suicide bombing 
at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport that killed 37, 
reportedly accomplished with an IED of 2-5 kilograms, 
did cause some flights to be diverted to other airports 
in Moscow immediately following the attack. However, 
Domodedovo airport still remained open, and damage 
to airport infrastructure was minimal. While fatalities 
and physical damage would be less compared to a large 
truck bomb, the public averseness to travel would be 
similar, resulting in social and business disruptions, loss 
of tourism, etc. We will assume a mean loss of $5 billon. 
For reference, the losses sustained from the 2005 
London and the 2004 Madrid bombings, which killed 52 
and 191 commuters, respectively (where IED size was 
relatively small) amounted to no more than $5 billion 
in direct and indirect losses (including loss of life, loss 
of tourism, business interruption, etc.) (Mueller and 
Stewart 2011b). However, a coordinated set of multiple 
bombings in the centre of a city is likely to inflict far 
greater indirect costs than a single explosion at an 
isolated airport. 
It should be noted that airports sprawl, are only two or 
three stories high and therefore damage to a portion is 
unlikely to be nearly as significant as damage to a taller 
or more compact structure. Moreover, if a bomb does 
explode at an airport, the consequences would probably 
be comparatively easier to deal with: passengers could 
readily be routed around the damaged area, for example, 
and impact on the essential function of the airport would 
be comparatively modest (Mueller and Stewart 2011b). 
This suggests that the losses proposed above might 
be skewed more to lower values, but public fear and 
averseness to air travel may increase these losses.
The attacks in Mumbai in 2008 bears some 
resemblance to the public grounds shooting threat. 
Two attackers targeted a crowded Mumbai railway 
station killing over 50 people, and injuring a hundred 
others, and more were killed in nearby hotels and 
restaurants by other terrorists. As with other threat 
scenarios, losses resulting from loss of life and physical 
damage are minor when compared to indirect losses. 
The mean cost in this case might total $2 billion.
If we take a VSL of $6.5 million, then the economic 
loss caused by 300 fatalities on a downed airliner is 
approximately $2 billion. Added to this is the cost of 
a large commercial airliner, of $200 million to $250 
million.  If we also include forensic and air transport 
crash investigations, the direct economic loss of a 
luggage bomb or suicide bomber is approximately 
$2.5 billion.  Death rates lower than 300 will reduce 
direct losses considerably, of course. The economic 
consequences of a luggage bomb or suicide bomber 
would likely be less than the shocking events of 9/11, 
so we will assume that a reasonable medium loss is 
$25 billion.
If hijackers succeed in commandeering an airliner and 
crashing it into a target, then loss will be considerable. 
The $10 billion in losses from the 9/11 Pentagon 
attack would be a plausible lower value of economic 
loss, and $100 billion in losses and equivalent to 
the 9/11 losses from a single aircraft, is a plausible 
upper bound. A medium loss of $50 billion is thus 
reasonable.
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Airport CT policing is less likely to be effective against attacks 
on aircraft, i.e. hijackings or suicide bombers. However, if the 
terrorists are detected during passenger screening, prompt 
police action is essential to avoid premature detonation of an 
IED. Again, good intelligence should boost the risk reduction. 
To illustrate the cost-benefit analysis we will assume that CT 
policing reduces risk identically for all six threats. We will also 
generously assume a risk reduction of ΔR=50% for each threat. 
That is, we will assume, for each of the six threats, that airport CT 
policing will reduce by 50% whatever residual risk remains after 
all other security measures have had their risk-reducing effect. 
This is likely to be 50% of a rather small number for Threats 4, 5 
and 6, and 50% of a larger one for Threats 1, 2, and 3.
We have relied on ‘best guess’ risk reductions. However, expert 
opinions, fault trees and logic diagrams, together with systems 
engineering and reliability approaches, will aid in assessing 
complex interactions involving threats, vulnerabilities and 
consequences (see Stewart and Mueller 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 
for airliner security). A more detailed and comprehensive 
study is required to properly model the complex interactions 
and interdependencies in airport passenger terminal security. 
Nonetheless, the risk reductions noted in Table 2 provides a 
basis to assess the influence and sensitivity of policy options on 
risk reduction and the cost-effectiveness of security measures.
3.5 Co-Benefits of Airport CT Policing
The co-benefits of CT policing - such as reduction in crime and 
reassurance to the travelling public - can be substantial. The cost 
of crime ranges from $2,000 (theft) to $85,000 (serious assault) 
to $9,000,000 for homicide (Heaton 2010). For example, if each 
CT police officer deters or disrupts one assault, theft or other 
criminal act once per year at $15,000 per crime averted, then 
for 300-350 airport CT police officers this gives a co-benefit of 
approximately $5 million per year.
Data on the effect that visible airport policing has on passengers 
is scarce, although a visible police presence may act to reassure 
the travelling public.  However, one study (Grosskopf 2006) 
concludes that visible security measures directed at terrorism 
can have the opposite effect, by alarming people. If a visible 
police presence does prove overall to reassure passengers that 
air travel is safer, this may lead to higher passenger numbers and 
more revenue for airport operators and airlines. If we assume 
that airport CT policing contributes to a very modest passenger 
growth of 0.1 of 1% then, based on Qantas and Virgin Australia 
revenues of $19.6 billion in 2012, this corresponds to an increase 
of $19.6 million in revenues for Qantas and Virgin Australia. 
Other airlines would also benefit, as would airport operators. 
Therefore, a co-benefit of $19.6 million is an under-estimate. 
The total co-benefit is therefore the sum of $5 million and $19.6 
million, or $24.6 million, which we round to $25 million per year.
4. RESULTS
Our best estimates of the risk analysis input parameters are 
given in Table 2.  We also include the following as inputs:
• Cost of Security Measure = $90 million per year
• Co-Benefits = $25 million per year
 
Threat
Relative 
Threat 
Likelihood
Vulnerability Risk Reduction 
from Airport 
CT Policing
Consequences 
($ billion)
1. large VBIED 13.3% 15% 50% 10
2. small IED in public place 13.3% 30% 50% 5
3. shooting 13.3% 90% 50% 2
4. IED in checked luggage 20.0% 30% 50% 25
5. suicide bomber boards aircraft 20.0% 30% 50% 25
6. hijackers boards aircraft 20.0% 20% 50% 50
 
Table 2. “Best Estimates” for Input Parameters.
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Table 3 shows the benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) generated for 
airport CT policing and a range of annual threat probabilities. 
Note that, in this case, the threat probability is the probability 
of attack at any large airport in Australia that has AFP airport 
CT police, and that the threat has not been thwarted by other 
security or police agencies (or the public). A security measure
 is cost-effective when BCR exceeds one.
and security measures (as well as by public awareness and 
response, etc.).
If the annual threat probability at all airports in Australia is less 
than 1% (or one in a hundred) the BCR for airport CT policing 
is significantly less than one, and the security measure 
consequently fails to be cost-effective by a considerable 
margin. However, a threat probability of 50% (or one attack 
every two years) would yield a BCR of 15.8 and airport CT 
policing would be cost-effective under that condition, and $1 
of cost would buy $15.80 in benefits. Table 3 shows that airport 
CT policing would also be cost-effective when the annual 
threat probability exceeds 5% or one attack every 20 years - 
that is, it would have to be solely responsible for deterring, 
foiling, or protecting against one threat every twenty years for 
the security measures to be cost-effective. It also needs to be 
kept in mind that many threats against the aviation industry 
would be deterred, foiled or prevented by other (non airport) 
police and security measures (as well as by public awareness 
and response, etc.).
Annual Threat Probability
Annual Probability of a Successful or 
Unsuccessful Attack at any Austral-
ian Airport in the Absence of Airport 
CT Policing
Benefit-to-Cost 
Ratio
0.1 percent 0.31
1 percent 0.59
5 percent 1.83
10 percent 3.39
25 percent 8.06
50 percent 15.8
100 percent1 31.4
200 percent 62.5
 1 one attack per year
Table 3. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio for Airport CT 
Policing.
Figure 1 shows the minimum risk reduction for the BCR to 
equal one, and thus to be cost-effective as a function of the 
annual threat probability. Clearly, if that threat probability is 
5% per year, risk reduction must exceed 23% for airport CT 
policing to be cost-effective. If the annual threat probability is 
less than 1%  then risk reduction would need to exceed 100%, 
which is not feasible, and so airport CT policing would not be 
cost-effective under that condition.
 
Figure 1. Minimum Risk Reduction Required for 
Airport CT Policing to be Cost-Effective.
The co-benefit of CT airport policing may well exceed $25 
million per year, particularly if CT airport policing is able 
to utilise number plate recognition capability, passenger 
photograph identification and other measures to apprehend 
people with outstanding criminal issues. If a security measure 
also enhances the passenger experience, there would be an 
additional co-benefit, dramatically improving the measure’s 
cost-effectiveness.
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
This Working Paper sets out the basic principles of risk and 
cost-benefit analysis. These principles are applied to airport 
CT policing provided by the AFP. The results are preliminary, 
and based on our ‘best estimates’ using publicly sourced 
material, and are a starting point for this type of risk analysis. 
The preliminary results show the combinations of risk 
reduction and threat probability that allow airport CT policing 
to be cost-effective. For example, airport CT policing is cost-
effective if it reduces risk by approximately 25% and that the 
probability of an attack at any airport in Australia exceeds 
5% per year. The co-benefits of airport CT policing - such as 
reduction in crime and reassurance to the travelling public - 
can be considerable, and will dramatically improve the cost-
effectiveness of airport CT policing. Further work should 
focus on more comprehensive threat scenarios; the layers of 
airport security, interactions and interdependencies; analysis 
of operational data on effectiveness of airport CT policing; and 
improved cost data, including co-benefits. The scope could be 
broadened to encompass all airport police, their rates of crime 
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deterrence and prevention, and propose how airport policing 
may be made more effective/efficient by the use of other 
security measures, for example, number plate recognition 
capability and passenger photograph identification ID.
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